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Abstract 
 
The paper adapts a static model of television advertising into a dynamic scenario. In 
its original form, the model consists on a profit maximization problem of a television 
network working in a competitive environment. The network sells commercial time to 
advertisers and tries to minimize the effects of viewers’ aversion to ads. Viewers are 
assumed heterogeneous with regard to the preferences over the types of products companies 
sell through ad time. Into this framework we introduce an intertemporal rule reflecting the 
possible preference changes of consumers (these are boundedly rational and their utility for 
different types of products varies over time). The introduction of the intertemporal rule 
originates interesting dynamic results, namely in what concerns the evolution over time of 
crucial variables like the total time of broadcasting that networks allocate to advertising or 
the amount of revenues that satisfies the profit maximization condition. As in the original 
model, attention will be given to the possibility, that cable television allows, of ad 
addressability.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relevance of advertising revenues in the television network business justifies 
the need for a theoretical framework aimed at explaining the connection between 
networks’ contents and the relationship that media establish between consumers with 
distinct preferences and firms who wish to advertise the products they sell.  
Various models explore such connections. Some of the most prominent include 
the path breaking work by Steiner (1952), in his specific case regarding radio 
broadcasting, and recent contributions like Goettler (1999), McDowell and Sunderland 
(2000), Esteban, Gil and Hernandez (2001), Kieshnick, McCullough and Wildman 
(2001), Byzalov and Shachar (2004), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2004), Peitz 
and Valletti (2004) and Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005), among others. This 
theoretical work follows on the footsteps of important empirical contributions, which 
address some illustrative case studies: Smith (1999) analyzes advertising profitability 
for other media besides television and radio broadcasting (in particular, he addresses 
the market for non daily newspapers); Sonnac (2000) looks as well to advertising in the 
press, studying in detail the attitude of consumers towards ads; Fare, Grosskopf, Seldon 
and Tremblay (2004), and Reid, King, Martin and Soh (2005) search for evidence on 
the effectiveness of media advertising and the degree in which television is in this 
respect a substitute relatively to other media. 
The present paper explores further and illustrates numerically and graphically one 
of the existing advertising models, namely the Kim and Wildman (2006) model, 
henceforth KW. In its basic structure, this theoretical framework explores the profit 
maximization behaviour of a representative television network. Assuming that costs are 
constant (i.e., in this case, independent from advertising time, which is the endogenous 
variable of the model), the profit maximization becomes a revenue maximization setup, 
where revenues are essentially determined by the decisions of the network concerning 
the time of broadcasting that is destined to be sold to advertisers.  
Two conflicting forces are taken in consideration in this problem: the revenues 
generated by selling advertising time and the loss of viewers that occurs when ad time 
is raised, given that viewers are considered as disliking commercials. The loss of 
viewers is interpreted in two ways: first, when ad time is augmented, individuals simply 
change network, and this has a direct impact on the amount of ad time networks can sell 
to advertisers; second, if one considers a subscription television service (cable TV), as 
the network rises ad time it will lose paying clients. 
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The main feature of the KW model is the fact that it considers heterogeneous 
television viewers. These are not necessarily heterogeneous in what concerns their 
tastes about TV programs, but they distinguish themselves in what concerns the type of 
commodities they generally acquire. Therefore, one will encounter as well various 
types of firms that advertise their goods trying to target the viewers that reveal a 
preference for such goods. The heterogeneity assumption has important consequences 
over the solution of the maximization problem, namely regarding the optimal profit 
level and the time of broadcasting time that, in the optimum, is allocated to 
commercials. 
This theoretical framework gains a new appeal when we acknowledge the 
possibilities that the digital cable television supply. In particular, new technologies are 
now achieving two relevant results: they can help in collecting information about 
consumers’ tastes and preferences and they are beginning to turn it possible to target 
advertising, that is, the same advertising time can be used to send different commercial 
information to different types of consumers. The combination of these two factors 
implies the possibility of selling the same advertising time to different types of 
producers, what has unambiguous advantages to the network’s profit objective. The 
possibility of ad addressability has also effects over the total commercial time in a 
competitive market environment, but these effects are not clear a priori; they will 
depend on the specific assumptions and structure of the model. 
The KW model furnishes a benchmark tool to the study of the relation between 
television networks programming policies and the role of advertising and it can be 
extended in multiple directions. In this paper, one of such directions is explored. We 
introduce a dynamic setup by considering that consumer preferences over different 
types of goods change intertemporally, given three types of effects: first, we consider a 
constant rate of utility appreciation / depreciation. Individuals do not have to maintain 
forever the same degree of utility from a type of good. They can progressively like it 
more or like it less. This rate translates such an effect. Second, there is an imitation or 
diffusion effect that leads each individual to prefer a kind of good that others also 
prefer. Third, the imitation effect can be overcome by a conspicuous consumption 
effect [see Benhabib and Bisin (2002)]: when individuals realize that many other 
individuals also consume that good, their preference for it may drop down as the 
consumption no longer represents outstanding status. 
The previous three effects are associated to a bounded rationality mechanism that 
works through a discrete choice rule [see McFadden (1973), Manski and McFadden 
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 4 
 
(1982) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1991)]. This choice rule has proved 
important in explaining other economic phenomena, like the working of financial 
markets [Brock and Hommes (1998), Gaunersdorfer (2000)] or how heterogeneous 
inflation expectations contribute to endogenous business cycles [Branch and McGough 
(2006), Gomes (2006), Gomes, Mendes, Mendes and Sousa Ramos (2006)]. 
The dynamic framework regarding consumers / viewers’ preferences with the 
previous properties reveals a very rich set of long run equilibrium properties: a fixed 
point stable steady state is accomplishable for some sets of parameter values, but for 
others, also reasonable, sets of parameter values cycles of various periodicities and 
even chaotic motion is encountered. Thus, one may have a long term time series for 
viewers preferences about commodities that, although being determined under a purely 
deterministic setup, exhibits fluctuations, and therefore it becomes difficult or even 
impossible to predict how viewers will behave in the long run with respect to the 
products they wish to acquire.  
Because consumer preferences are a central piece in the representative network 
revenue function (networks sell ad time to advertisers under the assumption that these 
only pay advertising directed to the viewers potentially interested in acquiring their 
goods), the possible periodic or a-periodic long term results will also characterize the 
evolution over time of the share of programming time dedicated to advertising and the 
revenues of the network.  
The main novelty over the KW model that this new assumption about dynamic 
preferences under bounded rationality allows is that there is the possibility of becoming 
unfeasible to determine exactly how much the network will spend in advertising time 
and how much will be the optimal profit in the long run. 
The model will be explored mainly through numerical examples and graphical 
illustrations because general results about global dynamics are not determinable. 
Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis will be able to reveal some meaningful 
regularities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic 
structure of the KW model, section 3 presents the intertemporal mechanics of 
preferences over a bounded rationality scenario; dynamic properties of the model are 
discussed in sections 4 and 5; section 4 treats the conventional case of ad non 
addressability; section 5 explores the targeted commercials case. Section 6 briefly 
discusses another insight: the possibility of dynamic preferences not only over products 
but also over programs. Finally, section 7 concludes.    
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2. The Kim-Wildman Model 
 
As stated in the introduction, the KW model furnishes the basic structure for our 
analysis of television advertising in the presence of intertemporal changes in 
consumers’ preferences. We briefly review the structure of the model.  
The baseline idea is that a finite number of networks (i.e., programming service 
providers) compete for revenues, which come from two sources: advertisers and final 
consumers (viewers). Networks obey to some symmetry conditions: (i) production costs 
are fixed and equal to all networks (every network maximizes profits by maximizing 
revenues); (ii) viewers can change from one network to another, but it is supposed that 
they do not abandon the market, that is, when one network loses viewers, these will 
continue to watch television distributed equally among all the other service providers; 
(iii) networks are Cournot competitors in the sense that their business decisions are 
taken on the assumption of no change in the behaviour of competitors.  
The last of the previous assumptions allows us to consider a representative 
network, relatively to which one is able to analyze optimizing behaviour (the other 
networks will operate in a same way). 
Consumers or viewers are separated in two groups. This separation has nothing to 
do with tastes regarding programs that are broadcasted by networks [another 
simplification of the model is that viewers are indifferent regarding networks’ contents, 
as long as the time of effective (without ads) program service provided by each one of 
them is the same]. The distinction is associated with the final consumption role of 
viewers and the way they are affected by advertising. Following the original 
formulation, we distinguish between right-handed viewers (RH) and left-handed 
viewers (LH). They consume different bundles of goods: goods RH and LH, 
respectively. There is also a finite number of firms in the market that sell and advertise 
the two sets of goods; thus, firms are also of two types. 
Let αt be the share of viewers that in a given moment t prefer to acquire goods RH 
(accordingly, 1-αt is the share of LH type viewers). Differently from the KW model, 
one is assuming an intertemporal setup (that will be discussed in the next section), and 
therefore subscript t allows us to locate ourselves in time.1 
                                                 
1
  We should be careful in our analysis with the use of the term ‘time’. The problem is intertemporal, and 
therefore there is a sequence of time periods from t=0 until a non specified moment in the future. Each 
period contains a unit of time that can be divided between the effective broadcasting of television 
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Advertisers RH and LH will pay to the representative network to broadcast their 
commercials; they pay rR(aRt) and rL(aLt), respectively. In these revenue functions, aRt 
and aLt are the amounts of programming time the network allocates in each time period 
to commercials of each type. Following KW, the revenue functions will display positive 
and diminishing returns to ad time, given the intuitive idea that repeating the same 
message over and over again has a marginal decreasing effect over consumers and, thus, 
firms will not be willing to pay the same for each additional unit of time on the air. 
Because our model becomes hard to analyze once we introduce the intertemporal 
component, we will work with specific functional forms. In the present case, the 
following functions are considered: θρ RtRRtR aar ⋅=)(  and θρ LtLLtL aar ⋅=)( , ρR,ρL>0, 
0<θ<1. These functions clearly obey the specified conditions r’>0 and r’’<0. 
Having understood how advertisers contribute to the network’s revenues, we must 
look now to the viewers’ side. If we have considered a free television service acting in a 
monopolistic market and if there were no legal constraints to how much advertising a 
TV station could transmit, the network’s revenue would be maximized with a level of 
commercials that were certainly above a social optimum value. But our model is 
different from this extreme scenario in several ways. We are working with a competitive 
market and we make the reasonable assumption that viewers dislike commercials. 
Furthermore, we take the additional assumption that viewers pay to watch television (a 
subscription cable TV service is considered). Under this scenario, two effects arise: (i) 
the license fee of the network decreases when time dedicated to commercials rise (i.e., 
the amount a viewer is willing to pay to access a channel falls with advertising time); 
(ii) as individuals can switch from one network to the others, the network will lose 
viewers for other networks if it rises commercials time. 
These two effects can be translated analytically. The first will be given by a 
function f(at), with at the total time of advertising in each period that a network 
transmits. The function relates to the per subscriber fee collected by the network; 
obviously, this fee falls with a rise in at, so that f’<0. An admissible functional form for 
this function is tt aaf /)( ϕ= , with ϕ>0. The second effect states that there is a function 
s(at) that defines the network’s share of all viewers, in such a way that s’<0. We 
consider ωσ −⋅= tt aas )( , with σ>0 and 0<ω<1. 
                                                                                                                                               
programs and advertising. Therefore, the term ‘advertising time’ will be generally used to designate the 
share of each period time dedicated to commercials broadcasting. 
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As stated previously, the optimization problem of the network is, in fact, a 
problem of revenue maximization. In each moment of time, the representative network 
solves problem (1).2 
 
[ ] )()()1()()(),( tLtLtRtRttLtRt afVararasVaaRMax ⋅+⋅−+⋅⋅⋅= αα  (1) 
 
In (1), parameter V defines the total number of television viewers. 
The way in which we will solve problem (1) depends on two features. The first 
feature is related to the adopted notion of dynamics. We will introduce a temporal 
dimension by considering that αt varies in time. This is, in the original model, a 
constant, and in our formulation a state variable (the network is unable to control its 
evolution). Therefore, the control variables for the network continue to be the same as in 
the KW model: the ad time the service provider can sell to each firm. In this sense, from 
the network point of view, the problem continues to be static: problem (1) can be solved 
in exactly the same way in all time periods from today to infinity. The second main 
feature is associated with a central piece of the argument of KW, that is, the possible 
addressability of advertising time. 
In its conventional form, television can only provide untargeted (non addressable) 
advertising. Untargeted commercials are delivered to the whole audience, independently 
of the type of consumers. In its traditional form, television is unable to separate 
audiences and to furnish to each audience the advertisements relating to the goods they 
frequently purchase. In terms of the network business, the main consequence of the non 
addressability property of television is that the same units of commercial time cannot be 
occupied by more than one advertiser. The translation of this idea to our model is 
straightforward: the total ad time is just the sum of the time sold to each type of 
advertiser, that is, at=aRt+aLt; in this case, we define a new variable ut that is the share 
of ad time associated to RH advertisers, so that aRt=ut⋅at and aLt=(1-ut)⋅at. Problem (1) 
can be restated for the particular case of non addressability as follows, 
 
[ ] )())1(()1()()(),( tttLtttRttttU afVauraurasVuaRMax ⋅+⋅−⋅−+⋅⋅⋅⋅= αα  (2) 
 
                                                 
2
  For a similar presentation of revenues maximization see the original KW model. 
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The advantage of analyzing (2), over (1), is that only two control variables, 
relatively to which we should maximize RU, are present: the total time of advertising 
and the share of advertising time associated to one of the goods’ types. 
New technologies applied to cable television are beginning to make advertising 
addressable. If, by any means, networks and advertisers are able to compile information 
about the preferences of consumers and if television addressability technology is 
available, it will be possible to sell the same advertising time two times, that is, to the 
two types of goods providers. The simultaneous delivery of distinct commercials to 
different viewers implies relevant changes in the model; now, advertising time becomes 
non rival, that is, the same advertising time can be simultaneously sold to both types of 
producers / advertisers. If we consider the limit case where all commercial time can be 
targeted, then aRt=at and aLt=at, turning the maximization problem into the one in 
expression (3), 
 
[ ] )()()1()()()( ttLttRtttT afVararasVaRMax ⋅+⋅−+⋅⋅⋅= αα  (3) 
 
As in the benchmark KW model, one of the purposes of the analysis consists in 
comparing untargeted and targeted ads scenarios. It is relevant to understand how total 
time of advertising varies between the two cases and how the targeting possibility 
affects optimal revenues. After characterizing consumer preferences in the next section, 
we will derive and compare such results.  
 
3. The Dynamics of Consumer Preferences 
 
Although we have included time subscripts into variables on last section’s model, 
this was presented essentially as a static one period problem. In this section, we turn the 
model dynamic by deriving a difference equation that describes the motion in time of 
variable αt. Recall that αt is the share of viewers / consumers that prefer to acquire RH 
products and therefore react essentially to advertisement of this type of goods. Now we 
allow preferences to change. They will not change as a result of advertising (we assume 
that advertising has the ability to stimulate the viewer to buy a larger quantity of the 
product that the viewer already prefers, but it has no capacity to change preferences); 
instead, preferences will change given a set of three effects and a bounded rationality 
mechanism.  
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Let QRt and QLt be the utility withdrawn by one consumer from potentially 
purchasing RH and LH goods, respectively. These utility values will change given three 
effects: 
i) A depreciation / appreciation of utility effect: households can gain or lose 
interest in acquiring a good independently of any other factor besides their own 
subjective perception of the good’s quality; 
ii) A network / imitation effect: this occurs when individuals withdraw higher 
utility when the share of consumers interested in the goods in question rise. This effect 
generally occurs for a relatively low level of the referred share; 
iii) A conspicuous consumption effect: when the share of individuals consuming 
the goods is high, as it rises even further individuals may want to consume less of the 
goods because it is no longer a symbol of status to acquire them; consumers will 
outstand if they become interested on the other, less preferred, good. 
To better understand the second and third effects, figure 1 presents two diagrams 
where the imitation and conspicuous properties are depicted. As we have stated, for a 
given individual the variation on utility is determined by the share of consumers / 
viewers that already show preference for the good: first, the imitation process leads the 
individual consumer to ‘follow the mob’ and to withdraw higher utility just because 
other individuals are beginning to prefer that good or goods. After some point (that here 
we consider αt=0.5 to simplify computation and analysis, but that does not need to be 
exactly this value), the conspicuous effect dominates: each consumer will be less 
interested in the good, i.e., he will attribute less utility to it, because the act of 
consumption will no longer allow him to outstand relatively to other consumers. In 
figure 1, the left diagram relates to utility changes regarding goods of type RH; the right 
diagram is concerned with goods of type LH. 
 
Figure 1 
  
Note in figure 1 that if the share of individuals preferring one or the other type of 
goods is very low or very high, then utility varies negatively, and it will vary positively 
if the number of consumers preferring each type of good is an intermediate value. 
The functions in figure 1 can be translated analytically. Equations (4) and (5) 
present the utility variation functions, including the three referred effects. These 
equations are the ones presented in the figure, plus a last term in the right hand side of 
each equation that corresponds to the utility appreciation / depreciation  effect that is 
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independent from share α; it only depends on the own dynamics regarding each 
consumer formation of preferences. 
 
0  given,   ,)1(8 01 >+−−⋅=−+ mQQmmQQ RRtttRtRt µαα  (4) 
 
0  given,   ,)1(8 01 >+−−⋅=−+ nQQnnQQ LLtttLtLt µαα  (5) 
 
If µ=0, in (4) and (5), these equations are just the ones presented in figure 1, 
which are able to address the issues regarding the way individual utility is dependent on 
the share of individuals with exactly the same preferences. Considering parameter µ a 
positive or negative real number, we are stating that in consumer preferences there is a 
natural tendency for preferring more (µ>0) or less (µ<0) of each type of good over 
time. 
To complete the dynamic preferences framework, we have to select a preference 
change rule. Equations (4) and (5) give the evolution of utility values. If one just 
considers a full rationality setup, each consumer would evaluate and compare utility 
results in every moment of time and choose RH when QRt>QLt and LH when QLt>QRt. 
Instead of full rationality, we assume that individuals are boundedly rational, that is, the 
share of consumers choosing one of the types of goods is given by the discrete choice 
rule  
 
)exp()exp(
)exp(
LtRt
Rt
t bQbQ
bQ
+
=α  (6) 
 
Regard that αt can be, in this case, simultaneously interpreted as the share of 
individuals preferring RH goods or the probability of each individual choosing RH 
goods instead of LH goods. Parameter b assumes a special relevance in (6). It is known 
as the intensity of choice and it is a non negative value. When b is close to zero, such 
implies a low degree of rationality, in the sense that consumers will not tend to change 
preferences even though the non selected set of goods gives systematically better utility 
results over time. For high values of the intensity of choice, the probability of changing 
preferences as the utility results vary becomes higher. This can be interpreted as an 
increase on the degree of rationality (such that when b→∞, we would be on the case of 
complete rationality), but it is also sometimes interpreted, specially in the finance 
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literature, as a case where individuals just adopt a herd behaviour, without weighting all 
the benefits and costs of changing preferences between types of goods [see Hirshleifer 
(2001)]. 
From equations (4), (5) and (6), it is possible to withdraw a difference equation 
that characterizes the evolution of share α over time (eliminating from the analysis, in 
this way, the utility variables). One reaches equation (7) (an appendix at the end of the 
paper derives this equation), 
 
[ ]( )

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
 −
+=
+
+ 1)1(8)(exp
111
1
1 tt
t
t
t mnb ααα
α
α
µ
 (7) 
 
Equation (7) is a rule of preferences switching derived from a set of reasonable 
assumptions about human behaviour. The introduction of such a rule into the 
advertising model of section 2 allows for adding a dynamic component to the model 
with various implications that are important to discuss. In dynamic models we may 
distinguish between transitional dynamics, the period that goes from the initial state to a 
stationary long run state, and the steady state, where some regularities are observable 
and that can be interpreted as a state that does not suffer any qualitative relevant 
changes unless some external disturbance occurs. 
In the following sections, we will be mainly concerned with the long term state of 
the model, after the transition phase is fulfilled, that is, we will analyze the long run 
scenario that remains unchanged unless some shock over parameter values succeeds. 
Nevertheless, we must remark that it is not the same thing to analyze a static setup as 
the original KW model and the long run steady state of a dynamic model. This last state 
is reached only because there is a past history that gave rise to it. Past periods are not 
forgotten; by the contrary, they are the ones that allowed for the existence of the 
achieved state. This remark is important when addressing the model’s results in the next 
sections. 
    
4. Long Run Results with Untargeted Commercials 
 
In this and in the following sections we study the KW model as described in 
section 2, given preference dynamics as characterized in section 3. We begin by 
considering the case in which ad addressability is not feasible, that is, the case of 
untargeted commercials. This is the case translated into expression (2). Recall that the 
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television network controls both the total time of advertising that is sold in each period 
and the share of commercials time that is attributed to each type of advertisers. Hence, 
revenues maximization implies, in this case, solving 0=∂
∂
t
U
u
R
 and 0=∂
∂
t
U
a
R
. 
Making the computation for the specific functional forms that were assumed, one 
gets 
 

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Expression (8) reveals the optimal share of ad time allocated to advertisers RH. 
We immediately observe the intuitive result that the higher the number of viewers 
preferring goods RH, the larger will be the relative amount of ads of this type of goods 
that are broadcasted by the network, in order for this to maximize profits.  
Relatively to the total time of advertising per period, result (9) indicates that such 
time is dependent on shares ut and 1-ut and that we must assume the condition θ>ω in 
order to assure a positive value for the total advertising time, that is, positive returns on 
advertising time sold have to be more pronounced than negative returns on the loss of 
viewers to other channels as a result of increasing advertising time. 
If there were no changes in preferences across periods, it would be straightforward 
to interpret (8) and (9). With the setup introduced in section 3 we lose in simplicity but 
gain in richness of results. To obtain meaningful conclusions it is necessary to consider 
specific numerical examples. We take, for now, the following benchmark vector of 
parameter values: [V σ ω θ ρR ρL ϕ m n b µ]=[1,000; 1; 0.1; 0.25; 0.75; 0.5; 1; 3; 1; 
2.75; 0.5]. Some of these values will be changed or allowed to vary, along the analysis. 
The initial value of αt must also be defined (0<α0<1). 
Only the last four parameters have impact over the model’s dynamics, since these 
are the ones on equation (7), that defines the evolution of preferences. The others will 
just allow to determine the amount of total advertising time, the share of time allocated 
to commercials of each type and the total level of revenue of the network in each period. 
Thus, we begin by describing the motion underlying the preference dynamics equation. 
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 13 
 
To characterize the dynamics of (7), we present two bifurcation diagrams.3 Figures 
2 and 3 take the above vector of parameter values and make parameters b and µ to vary, 
respectively. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 
 
The bifurcation diagrams, which are drawn for the 1,000 observations after the 
first 1,000 transients, clearly indicate that a fixed point steady state result is not the only 
possible long term outcome. Cycles of various orders and total a-periodicity (chaotic 
motion) are found as well for several values of parameters. When the intensity of choice 
is varied (maintaining all the other values as given in the benchmark vector), we 
observe that a fixed point result exists for b lower than 2.1 (roughly), and that a 
bifurcation follows implying a period two cycle, which is broken for b around 2.5, 
giving place to a period 4 cycle. Cycles of other periodicities are observed as well, and 
for values of b between 2.7 and 3.1 and between 3.6 and 4.4 we regard that we have 
mostly situations of full a-periodicity, in the sense that our endogenous variable can 
possess any value of the ones indicated in the figure.  
Relatively to figure 3, a same kind of interpretation is possible. When varying the 
appreciation / depreciation of utility parameter multiple possibilities about steady state 
dynamics arise. In particular, we should note that in this specific case chaotic motion is 
found for both the possibility of utility appreciation and utility depreciation. Note, for 
instance, that after a given value of utility appreciation, the degree of predictability of 
the system rises as a-periodicity gives place to cycles of progressively lower order until 
reaching a fixed point result. 
The presence of cycles indicates that a fully deterministic rule of preferences 
dynamics, such as (7), does not produce a unique invariant long run result: the 
preferences share will alternate between two or more steady state outcomes (in cases of 
two period cycles or other periodic cycles), or it can follow a time series that does not 
display any kind of identifiable regularity, that is, it can follow a chaotic pattern. 
Figures 4 and 5 present, for the chosen vector of values of parameters, a phase 
diagram and a time series. With the time series it becomes clear that the selected 
example implies the presence of endogenous fluctuations (this is the long run behaviour 
                                                 
3
  The program used to draw these and all the following figures is iDMC (interactive Dynamical Model 
Calculator). This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright of 
Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio. 
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of the preferences share, drawn after withdrawing the first 1,000 observations). The 
phase diagram may be used to understand that in this case the equilibrium is not stable 
or unstable; the time series will just gravitate forever around the steady state value [To 
confirm this just draw a 45 degrees line, select an initial value for the endogenous 
variable and draw successive vertical lines from the 45 degree line to the function and 
horizontal lines from the presented function to the 45 degrees line. You will see that the 
steady state (the points in the intersection between the line and the function) is never 
accomplished, but a divergence process away from the steady state is not observed as 
well]. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 
 
A rigorous confirmation of the presence of chaotic motion in the case we are 
considering requires the computation of the Lyapunov characteristic exponent (LCE) 
associated to equation (7).4 A positive value of the LCE for a one equation system 
means that nearby orbits diverge exponentially or, in other words, there is sensitive 
dependence on the initial condition (SDIC). This coincides with the most widely 
accepted definition of chaotic motion: chaos relates to the fact of two trajectories 
departing from two points close to each other following completely different orbits. In 
the present case, for the selected set of parameter values, we confirm the presence of 
chaotic motion: LCE=0.426. 
As it is clear from expressions (8) and (9), advertising optimal results are heavily 
dependent on preferences. If these do not obey to a fixed point result in every 
circumstance, then cycles and chaos will be also reflected on the long term values of 
variables ut, at and RtU. Sticking with our benchmark case, figures 6, 7 and 8 present the 
time trajectories for these variables. These will be compared with the results for the 
targeted commercials case of the next section. 
 
Figures 6, 7, 8 
 
Note that each one of the figures 6 to 8 is drawn for 100 observations after the first 
1,000. The presence of chaotic motion governing preferences makes the long term of 
each one of the advertising model variables to be subject to endogenous fluctuations. 
                                                 
4
  This computation is done using iDMC. See Medio and Lines (2001) about the meaning and 
computation of LCEs. 
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For the concrete example, the share of advertising time sold to producers of type RH 
fluctuates around 0.75 and 1 (approximately); the total ad time varies between 6.75 and 
a value a little above 8 (we have not defined a unit for the ad time variable, but this can 
be thought as daily advertising broadcasting hours); and the total revenue will fluctuate 
between 950 and 1150 monetary units. 
 
5. Long Run Results with Targeted Commercials 
 
The possibility of ad addressability opens new opportunities for networks and for 
advertisers. From the point of view of the network, it seems obvious that the possibility 
of selling the same advertising time to two types of firms (or more) will have a positive 
impact over profits. A not so obvious result relates to the time allocated to advertising: 
will this grow or decline? In the present model, absolute answers cannot be presented, 
but we can study the subject under our benchmark case and related scenarios. In what 
follows, we confirm the positive impact of targeted commercials over revenues and 
inquire about the time spent with advertising. 
We solve maximization problem (3), that is, we derive an optimal level of 
advertising time from the condition 0=∂
∂
t
T
a
R
. The outcome is  
 
[ ]
)1/(1
)1()(
ωθ
αραρ
ϕ
σωθ −+−






−⋅+⋅⋅
⋅−
= tLtRta  (10) 
 
Expression (10) is similar to (9), but now variable ut disappears as a result of the 
addressability assumption. Once again it is fundamental that condition θ>ω holds.  
Using the same benchmark example with chaotic preferences as in the previous 
section, we characterize the targeted ads case dynamics with the presentation of figures 
9 and 10, that reveal how the total ad time and the network’s profits evolve in the long 
run. These time series should be compared with the ones in figures 7 and 8. To better 
make this comparison, we display two additional figures (figures 11 and 12). 
 
Figures 9, 10, 11, 12. 
 
From figures 11 and 12 we observe that, for the case in appreciation, advertising 
time falls when advertising is addressable and we confirm the rise in revenue that is 
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intuitively true. The blue dashed lines in these two figures show the case in which the 
targeted and untargeted ad cases would furnish the same results. Although chaotic 
motion exists, we regard that ad time effectively observed points are always below the 
dashed line, meaning that to maximize profits under ad addressability it is not necessary 
to broadcast so much commercials as in the conventional non addressability case. 
Furthermore, chaos does not distort in any way the revenues result; we see that the 
corresponding set of points (the long run attractor) is always above the dashed line, and 
therefore ad addressability means an optimal result where revenues are higher with 
lower advertising time. If one could generalize this result, one might say that ad 
addressability does not only benefit the network but also the viewer, who can assess 
more broadcasting time without advertising. 
To attempt to generalize the previous results we present table 1, where we 
compare ad time and profits between addressability and non addressability cases, for 
various sets of parameter values. 
 
Values of 
parameters 
Type of 
dynamics 
at
U 
at
T
 RtU RtT 
Benchmark Chaos 6.75-8.10 6.7-7.3 950-1,140 1,055-1,145 
b=2 Fixed point 7.21 6.88 1,063 1,113 
b=3.5 Period 6 6.68; 6.69; 
6.85; 6.92; 
9.13; 9.25 
6.68; 6.69; 
6.74; 6.77; 
7.86; 7.94 
829; 840; 
1,108;1,119; 
1,145;1,146 
965; 976; 
1,132;1,137; 
1,146;1,147  
µ=0.75 Period 2 6.91; 7.45 6.77; 6.98 1,029; 1,110 1,097; 1,133 
µ=-0.25 Chaos 6.71-9.9 6.69-8.9 775-1,143 859-1,145 
m=0.1 Fixed point 9.8 9.3 786 826 
m=3.3 Period 3 6.7; 6.86; 
8.71 
6.69; 6.75; 
7.6 
880; 1,118; 
1,145 
1,009;1,137; 
1,146 
n=0.5 Period 3 6.69; 6.87; 
9.15  
6.69; 6.75; 
7.87 
838; 1,116; 
1,145 
974; 1,136; 
1,146 
n=2 Fixed point 7.07 6.83 1,085 1,123 
ϕ=0.5 Chaos 3.68-4.42 3.66-3.98 867-1,040 963-1,045 
ϕ=2 Chaos 12.3-14.8 12.2-13.3 1,038-1,246 1,153-1,252 
V=500 Chaos 6.73-8.08 6.7-7.27 475-570 527-572 
V=2000 Chaos 6.73-8.08 6.7-7.27 1,898-2,277  2,108-2,287 
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σ=0.5 Chaos 12.3-14.76 12.25-13.29 519-623 577-626 
σ=2 Chaos 3.69-4.42 3.67-3.98 1,733-2,080 1,925-2,090 
ω=0.05 Chaos 4.89-5.83 4.87-5.27 1,029-1,226 1,138-1,232 
ω=0.2 Chaos 22.99-28.08 22.86-25.02 748-913 839-918 
θ=0.2 Chaos 10.61-12.57 10.56-11.51 875-1,037 956-1,041 
θ=0.5 Chaos 2.38-3.05 2.37-2.53 1,148-1,468 1,382-1,478 
ρR=0.5 Chaos 9.58-10.82 9.51-9.51 708-800 806-806 
ρR=0.9 Chaos 5.75-7.03 5.72-6.39 1,090-1,334 1,198-1,340 
ρL=0.25 Chaos 6.74-8.56 6.72-7.99 896-1,138 960-1,141 
ρL=0.9 Chaos 6.73-7.30 6.38-6.67 1,051-1,139 1,149-1,202 
 
Table 1 – Sensitivity analysis. 
 
In table 1, we have advertising time results and optimal revenues for several 
combinations of parameters. The first case considers our benchmark vector of parameter 
values that was characterized graphically. All the other 22 cases are studied for a change 
in one of the parameter values, maintaining all the rest in its original values. Recall that 
in the benchmark case we have chaotic dynamics, and only four parameters can change 
qualitatively this result, which are the parameters in equation (7), an equation that 
defines the movement over time of consumers’ preferences.  
Therefore, a first straightforward conclusion from the table is that any change in 
parameters, except in b, µ, m or n, will not modify the qualitative dynamic nature of our 
problem; this is why the last 14 cases in the table continue to respect to a situation of 
chaotic motion. For changes in the values of the referred four parameters, we can 
abandon chaos and have various types of periodic motion and fixed point stability. For 
the advanced examples, notice that three cases of fixed point are presented, along with 
one case of period 2 cycles, two cases of period 3 cycles and one case of cycles of 
period 6.  
Although studying a set of possible cases does not allow for universal conclusions, 
an important regularity is found for every studied example. In all cases, from fixed point 
stability, to cycles or chaos, one finds the same result as in the benchmark case: ad 
addressability implies higher long term profits and less advertising time. As in figures 
11 and 12, in every case there is a positive relation between ad time under the two 
assumptions (the addressability and non addressability assumptions) and between 
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optimal revenues under the two assumptions. This relation is always found for a higher 
ad time under non addressability and for a higher level of profits under addressability 
(these higher values appear in the columns in grey).  
Hence, all the proposed examples give rise to a same set of conclusions regarding 
the basic features of the long term behaviour of the variables of the advertising model, 
despite the different qualitative behaviour implied by the evolution of preferences.  
Note, in the table, that in the case of cycles with identifiable order, each value in 
the column relating non addressability corresponds to the value in the same position in 
the column of addressability (both for ad time and revenues); in the case of chaotic 
motion, we present an interval in which the fluctuation is bounded, and there is a 
positive relation between the two sets of addressability – non addressability values. 
Our main conclusion is that although the model is not robust to changes in 
parameter values regarding the qualitative long term dynamic behaviour, it seems robust 
to changes in the values of parameters in what concerns the main implications of the 
possibility of targeting commercials.  
 
6. A Further Insight 
 
In the KW model, besides product preference heterogeneity, program preference 
heterogeneity is also discussed. Consider that networks specialize in one of two types of 
programs (type 1 and type 2). Let βRt and 1-βRt be the shares of RH viewers who prefer 
type 1 and type 2 programs, respectively, and let βLt and 1-βLt be the shares of LH 
viewers who prefer type 1 and type 2 programs, respectively. 
In this section we adopt this environment to understand how consumer / viewer 
heterogeneity are combined in determining long term endogenous changes on audience 
shares. Thus, there is an important change on focus. We are no longer worried with an 
individual network profits but with the relation between audiences of different types of 
networks (between networks of the same type, the same competitive scenario of 
previous sections continues to hold).  
If LttRttt βαβαγ ⋅−+⋅= )1(  is the share of audience for programs of type 1 and 
if )1()1()1(1 LttRttt βαβαγ −⋅−+−⋅=−  is the share of audience for programs of type 
2, we can study the long term behaviour of the audiences ratio, )1( tt γγ − . To 
accomplish this, we assume that preferences for programs are determined by the same 
factors that determine the preferences for products: imitation – I will like what others 
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like; conspicuous behaviour – if all the others prefer program 1, I will try program 2; 
and cumulative utility / disutility – utility withdrawn from one program does not have to 
remain still over time. 
Therefore, in a parallel way to (7), one may consider (11) and (12), 
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Parameters µR and µL can possess positive or negative values. All other parameters in 
(11) and (12) are positive quantities. 
Combining (7), (11) and (12), multiple possibilities regarding dynamic outcomes 
arise. To illustrate some of these possibilities we consider the same set of parameter 
values as in previous sections plus the following vectors: [bR mR nR µR]=[5.5 2 1 -0.25] 
and [bL mL nL µL]=[3.3 1 3 0.1]. For these values, one may present the evolution over 
time of the audiences’ ratio (figure 13). Afterwards, a sensitivity analysis indicates how 
audiences are shaped by changes in parameter values. The values were selected in order 
to get chaotic motion for both program preference shares. 
 
Figure 13 
 
In figure 13, one can observe a long term time path for the audiences’ ratio with 
no identifiable periodicity. The chaotic motion, triggered by the bounded rationality 
mechanism involving preferences over consumption and television programs, implies 
that the overall preference for programs of type 1 and 2 changes dramatically from one 
period to the next. 
In table 2 a more detailed analysis of long term possibilities regarding program 
shares is provided by comparing several numerical examples. 
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Values of 
parameters 
Dynamics of 
αt 
Dynamics of 
βRt 
Dynamics of 
βLt 
Audience’s ratio 
Benchmark Chaos Chaos Chaos 0.12-97.4 
b=2; bR=1;  
bL=2 
Fixed point Fixed point Period 2 2.47; 2.85 
b=3.5; bR=10; 
bL=5 
Period 6 Fixed point Fixed point 0.001; 0.0013; 
0.03; 0.05; 1; 1.2 
µ=0.75;µR=0.25;  
µL=-0.5 
Period 2 Chaos Fixed point 1.54-294.5 
µ=-0.25; µR=0;  
µL=0.5 
Chaos Period 2 Period 3 0.1-72.8 
m=0.1; mR=1; 
mL=2 
Fixed point Fixed point Period 2 0.1; 0.32 
m=3.3; mR=3.3; 
mL=3.3 
Period 3 Fixed point Fixed point 0; 0.03; 0.58 
n=0.5; nR=1; 
nL=0 
Period 3 Chaos Period 2  0.18-214 
n=2; nR=2; 
nL=2 
Fixed point Fixed point Period 2 0.88; 0.92 
 
Table 2 – Heterogeneity in product and program preferences: dynamic results. 
 
Table 2 clarifies the kind of dynamics that audiences may be subject to. We have 
considered various examples that modify the values of the benchmark case. The 
dynamics of each one of the three preference equations is independent from the others 
and depends only on the parameters that are present in each one of the equations. The 
ratio of audiences is dependent on the three preference variables and the higher degree 
periodicity tends to dominate, that is, if chaos exists for one of the equations (7), (11) or 
(12), the audience’s ratio will also display chaotic motion; if two of the equations are 
characterized by a fixed point equilibrium and for the other a period 2 cycles is found, 
then the ratio will be given by a period 2 cycle as well.  
Regard that when chaotic motion is present, the ratio alternates between values 
lower and higher than 1, indicating that the most preferred type of programs will vary 
over time. When low periodicity cycles dominate, this can imply that one of the two 
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types of program is always preferred but with different intensities, or that periods of 
preference for one or the other type of program alternate over time. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
As any other firm, television networks must weight revenues and costs in order to 
maximize profits. Concerning revenues, advertising has a central role for networks. In 
the KW model, advertising influences revenues through three channels: advertisers pay 
to announce their products to potentially interested buyers, viewers tend to abandon the 
network if it broadcasts too much commercials and viewers tend to switch channels 
when comparing networks’ time dedicated to advertising. These features allow for a 
straightforward static analysis of the optimal level of profits and of the advertising time 
that networks must sell in order to maximize profits. 
The analysis becomes more interesting when two scenarios are compared: the 
conventional case, under which the same television transmission time cannot be sold 
simultaneously to different advertisers, and the case where advertising becomes 
addressable, as a result of exploring the new possibilities of cable television 
broadcasting. The analysis is also more insightful because heterogeneous consumers are 
considered: even if television viewers are homogeneous in terms of programming 
preferences, they differ in terms of preferences over types of goods sellers advertise on 
television. 
This paper has extended the KW analysis into a dynamic environment. In 
particular, one has derived a dynamic rule concerning the eventual change of product 
preferences by television viewers. If viewers are exposed to a set of effects that change 
the utility they withdraw from different types of products and if a bounded rationality 
mechanism allows for switching preferences, then it is possible to make an 
intertemporal analysis of the impact of advertising on networks’ profits. 
The proposed framework allowed for a large set of different qualitative long term 
results that went from fixed point stability, to low periodicity deterministic fluctuations 
and to chaotic motion. The main implication of this preferences’ structure is that long 
term outcomes for the advertising time on television programming, for the share of time 
attributed to one or to the other type of advertiser and for optimal profits are not 
necessarily predictable. For combinations of parameter values implying chaotic 
preference switching, the network is unable to know from the beginning how much 
profits and how much ad time it has to broadcast in the long term to guarantee an 
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optimal behaviour. It just knows that profits and ad time will vary within a specified 
interval. 
Despite the lack of predictability and the possibility of multiple long term results, 
some regularities are derived: first, the expected result that profits rise in the eventuality 
of targeted commercials is confirmed; second, all the proposed examples indicate that 
under ad addressability the share of programming time dedicated to commercials 
declines relatively to the non addressability case; third, if one incorporates dynamic 
rules for changes in program preferences as well as product preferences, we conclude 
that the type of dynamics matters: under cycles or chaos, the most desired type of 
program may vary over time in the long run. 
 
Appendix – Derivation of Equation (7) 
 
In this appendix, we derive equation (7) from (4), (5) and (6). 
Similarly to (6), one may present the share of consumers selecting goods’ type LH 
as 
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Taking logs, equations (6) and (A1) are equivalent to (A2) and (A3) respectively, 
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From (A2) and (A3) one withdraws the following relation, 
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which can be presented as well for period t+1, 
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Now, one can subtract each member of (A4) to each member of (A5) and obtain 
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Making use of (4) and (5), we rewrite (A6), 
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In (A7), the term RtLt QQ −  can be replaced by the equivalent expression in (A4), 
such that 
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Applying exponentials to (A8) in order to eliminate the logs from the relation, and 
solving in order to αt+1, we then promptly reach equation (7). 
 
References  
   
Anderson, S.; A. de Palma and J. Thisse (1993). Discrete Choice Theory of Product 
Differentiation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Anderson, S. P. and J. J. Gabszewicz (2005). “The Media and Advertising: A Tale of 
Two-Sided Markets.” CEPR discussion paper nº 5223. 
Benhabib, J. and A. Bisin (2002). “Advertising, Mass Consumption and Capitalism.” 
New York University working paper. 
Brock, W. A. and C. H. Hommes (1998). “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos 
in a Simple Asset Pricing Model.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
vol. 22, pp. 1235-1274. 
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 24 
 
Branch, W. and B. McGough (2006). “Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous 
Expectations in a New Keynesian Model.” University of California and Oregon 
State University. 
Byzalov, D. and R. Shachar (2004). “The Risk Reduction Role of Advertising.” 
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, vol. 2, pp. 283-320. 
Esteban, L.; A. Gil and J. M. Hernandez (2001). “Informative Advertising and Optimal 
Targeting in a Monopoly.” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 49, pp. 161-180. 
Fare, R.; S. Grosskopf; B. J. Seldon and V. J. Tremblay (2004). “Advertising Efficiency 
and the Choice of Media Mix: a Case of Beer.” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, vol. 22, pp. 503-522. 
Gabszewicz, J. J.; D. Laussel and N. Sonnac (2004). “Programming and Advertising 
Competition in the Broadcasting Industry.” Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, vol. 13, pp. 657-669. 
Gaunersdorfer, A. (2000). “Endogenous Fluctuations in a Simple Asset Pricing Model 
with Heterogeneous Agents.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 
24, pp. 799-831.  
Goettler, R. (1999). “Advertising Rates, Audience Composition, and Competition in the 
Network Television Industry.”  GSIA working paper nº 1999-28, Carnegie-Mellon 
University, Tepper School of Business. 
Gomes, O. (2006). “Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations.” The 
ICFAI Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. IV, pp. 32-51. 
Gomes, O.; V. M. Mendes; D. A. Mendes and J. Sousa Ramos. “Heterogeneous 
Inflation Expectations and the Stability of Monetary Policy.” ISCTE Business 
School working paper. 
Hirshleifer, D. (2001). “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing.” Journal of Finance, 
vol. 56, pp. 1533-1597. 
Kieshnick, R.; B. McCullough and S. Wildman (2001). “The Market for Television 
Advertising: Model and Evidence.” Review of Marketing Science, working paper 
series, Berkeley Electronic Press, nº 1-2-1015. 
Kim, E. M. and S. S. Wildman (2006). “A Deeper Look at the Economics of Advertiser 
Support for Television: the Implications of Consumption-Differentiated Viewers 
and Ad Addressability.” Journal of Media Economics, vol. 19, pp. 55-79. 
Manski, C. and D. McFadden (1981). Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with 
Econometric Applications. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 25 
 
McDowell, W. and S. Sunderland (2000). “Choice versus Chance: Using Brand Equity 
Theory to Explore TV Audience Lead-in Effects, a Case Study.” Journal of Media 
Economics, vol. 13, pp. 233-247.  
McFadden, D. (1973). “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior.” In 
P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic Press, 
pp.105-142. 
Medio, A. and M. Lines (2001). Nonlinear Dynamics: a Primer. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Peitz, M. and T. Valletti (2004). “Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay-TV versus 
Free-to-Air.” CEPR discussion paper nº 4771. 
Reid, L. N.; K. W. King; H. J. Martin and H. Soh (2005). “Local Advertising Decision 
Makers’ Perceptions of Media Effectiveness and Substitutability.” Journal of 
Media Economics, vol. 18, pp. 35-53. 
Smith, K. (1999). “Preprints versus Display Advertising: Which is More Profitable for 
Nondaily Newspapers?” Journal of Media Economics, vol. 12, pp. 233-245. 
Sonnac, N. (2000). “Readers’ Attitudes Toward Press Advertising: Are They Ad-Lovers 
or Ad-Averse?” Journal of Media Economics, vol. 13, pp. 249-259. 
Steiner, P. O. (1952). “Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of 
Competition in Radio Broadcasting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 66, pp. 
194-223. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 26 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Graphical illustration of imitation and conspicuous effects over utility changes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Bifurcation diagram (b,αt). 
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Figure 3 – Bifurcation diagram (µ,αt). 
 
Figure 4 – Phase diagram (αt,αt+1). 
 
Figure 5 – Time series (αt). 
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Figure 6 – Time series (ut; untargeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 7 – Time series (atU; untargeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 8 – Time series (RtU; untargeted commercials case). 
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Figure 9 – Time series (atT; targeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 10 – Time series (RtT; targeted commercials case). 
 
Figure 11 – Long term relation between atU and atT . 
The Dynamics of Television Advertising 30 
 
 
Figure 12 – Long term relation between RtU and RtT . 
 
 
Figure 13 – Time series of the audiences’ ratio. 
 
